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Abstract
Anthropic arguments in multiverse cosmology and string theory rely on the weak an-
thropic principle (WAP). We show that the principle is fundamentally ambiguous. It can
be formulated in one of two ways, which we refer to as WAP1 and WAP2. We show that
WAP2, the version most commonly used in anthropic reasoning, makes no physical predic-
tions unless supplemented by a further assumption of “typicality”, and we argue that this
assumption is both misguided and unjustified. WAP1, however, requires no such supple-
mentation; it directly implies that any theory that assigns a non-zero probability to our
universe predicts that we will observe our universe with probability one. We argue, there-
fore, that WAP1 is preferable, and note that it has the benefit of avoiding the inductive
overreach characteristic of much anthropic reasoning.
1 Introduction
Over the last twenty years or so, inflationary cosmologists have been toying with theoretical
models that postulate the existence of a multiverse, a set of quasi-universes (henceforth “uni-
verses”) which are more-or-less causally disjoint [1],[2]. String theorists, who once hoped to
predict a unique supersymmetric extension to the standard model, now find themselves con-
templating a similar scenario, with perhaps 10500 or more metastable low-energy vacua (the
“landscape”) realized via inflationary mechanisms as effectively distinct universes [3],[4],[5],[6].
The vast majority of the universes in these scenarios look nothing like our universe, the values
of the fundamental physical parameters (e.g., the cosmological constant) differing markedly
from the values we observe. A significant number of physicists have understood this situation
— in particular, the fact that universes like ours are atypical — to be problematic because, it
is felt, it reveals a lack of explanatory or predictive power. Others seem more concerned with
our inability to either confirm or falsify such theories. It is in addressing these concerns that
anthropic reasoning enters the picture.
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Anthropic reasoning is reasoning based on the use of the (weak) anthropic principle, artic-
ulated by Carter as
WAP: “What we can expect to observe must be restricted by the conditions nec-
essary for our presence as observers.” ([7], p. 291).
This seems unobjectionable; in fact, it is a tautology. As such, one wonders how it can do
any explanatory or methodological work, much less be the object of heated disagreement. We
will argue that the anthropic principle, as stated by Carter, contains what Bohr might have
called an “essential ambiguity”([8]), and that the problematic aspects of anthropic reasoning
stem from the use of a form of the principle which requires recourse to an additional and
unsupported assumption of “typicality” in order to make contact with observation. Though the
crucial importance of the “principle of mediocrity” which encodes the assumption of typicality
is understood by some, its connection to a particular form of the WAP and its status as a
distinct and unargued-for assumption seems not to be well understood.
2 Anthropic arguments
2.1 General form
The general strategy of an anthropic argument is as follows. Begin with some mulitiverse
hypothesis, a hypothesis which gives:
• a set of possible universes parametrized by the values taken by relevant physical param-
eters such as the cosmological constant, the dark matter density, etc., and
• a probability distribution describing the relative frequency of occurrence for these uni-
verses in the (generally infinite) ensemble.
Now, in accordance with WAP, restrict attention to the subset of universes that support the
existence of observers, since these are the only universes we could hope to observe, and consider
the distribution of the parameters over this “anthropic” subset. These are the universes it is
possible to observe, and so the predictions for what we can expect to observe should be based
on this subset.
Given the restriction to the anthropic subset, one has a new probability distribution for
each parameter reflecting the relative frequency with which the various values of the parameter
occur in the anthropic subset. If the parameters take on a continuous set of values, or even a
large but finite number, the probability of any particular value will be absurdly small, so that
no particular outcome is to be expected. What, then, does anthropic reasoning predict?
It is here that one must introduce an assumption of typicality, such as Vilenkin’s “principle
of mediocrity,” which he describes as “the assumption that we are typical among the observers
in the universe.” He elaborates,
Quantitatively, this can be expressed as the expectation that we should find our-
selves, say, within the 95% range of the distribution. This can be regarded as a
prediction at a 95% confidence level. ([9], p. 2)
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Equipped with this further assumption, one can infer that the observed values of the parameters
will lie within the 95% range.1 In short, if we assume we are typical (i.e., if we apply the
principle of mediocrity), we get a range of predicted outcomes which is a proper subset of the
anthropic subset.
From here, the anthropic reasoner will generally conclude that the observation of an (an-
thropically) typical value by us means that the theory has successfully explained the value
(since we are a generic prediction of the theory). Furthermore, she will judge that the obser-
vation of a typical value offers inductive support to the theory.
Similarly, observation of an atypical value is judged to constitute a disconfirmation, even
falsification, of the theory [10],[11]. However, from a logical standpoint, all that has been shown
by a failure to observe an anthropically typical value is that the conjunction of the theory and
the principle of mediocrity is inadequate. One might just as well impugn the principle of
mediocrity rather than the theory. The following example brings this out.
2.2 Example: the Googolverse
Consider a multiverse theory which postulates the existence of a “Googolverse”, an infinite
ensemble made up of 10100 (a googol) different sorts of universe, where “different sorts” means
that the universes are characterized by different values of one or more physical parameters.
The postulated theory also provides a probability distribution over the parameters, so that one
can talk about “typical” and “atypical” values. Suppose, finally, that the values we observe
are atypical, lying outside the 95% confidence interval. In such a situation, we might turn to
the anthropic principle in order to assess the theory.
Suppose that, upon doing an anthropic analysis of this multiverse, we discover that 105
of the 10100 sorts of universe support observers. In accordance with the anthropic principle,
we reason that these are the only universes we could possibly observe, and we go on to ask
whether what we observe — the value of the cosmological constant, the electron mass, and
so on — is typical of this observer-supporting, “anthropic” subset. In other words, would a
generic observer expect to see something like what we see? The anthropic reasoner says that
if the answer is no, then our theory should be regarded as an explanatory failure, and our
observation of the atypical values should count against acceptance of the theory.
So far, so good... perhaps. But suppose we analyze the observer-supporting subset further,
and discover that there are really only two general sorts of observers, Humans and Aliens, and
that Aliens are by far the dominant form of life in the observer-supporting subset. In fact, we
discover that only 17 of the 105 sorts of universes support the existence of Humans (Aliens
are apparently far more adaptable), and that our probability distribution tells us that these
account for only 0.1% (i.e., 100) of the sorts of universe in the observer-supporting subset.
Statistical analysis reveals that of this Human-accommodating subset of 17 sorts of universe,
the values we observe in our universe, one of the 17, are entirely typical.
In short, we come out looking like an atypical member of the Googolverse, an atypical mem-
ber of the observer-supporting subset, and a typical member of the Human-supporting subset.
What to conclude? Most anthropic reasoning seeks typicality (or “mediocrity”) amongst the
broadest possible subset of observers, judging that “it is prudent to condition probabilities,
1But note that the notion of typicality, of lying within some confidence interval, is not well-defined for all
probability distributions. For example, a flat distribution has no “typical” values. What, for example, is a
typical outcome of the roll of a fair die?
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not on a detailed description of ‘us’, but on the weakest condition consistent with ‘us’ that
plausibly provides useful results.” ([12], p. 5). Thus most anthropic reasoners would presum-
ably conclude that the observed values are not explained by the Googolverse hypothesis, and
a fortiori that these values do not support the hypothesis. On the other hand, the typical
member of the small subset of the human race who is not completely flummoxed by the idea
of a multiverse might well disagree, noting that the Googolverse hypothesis succeeds very well
in explaining what we observe, since we are Humans, not Aliens.
3 The Essential Ambiguity
The Googolverse example is of course a caricature, but it highlights the way in which the
particular choice of a reference class of observers can make an enormous difference to the
outcome of an anthropic argument. It does so via the additional requirement of typicality with
respect to the reference class.2 Given the seemingly uncontroversial nature of the WAP, it is
surprising that its application can be so contentious. In this section, we will see that this is a
result of an ambiguity in the principle itself.
Consider once again the Weak Anthropic Principle, “What we can expect to observe must
be restricted by the conditions necessary for our presence as observers.” How are we to under-
stand the phrase “our presence as observers”? Are we to understand it as talking about our
presence, or the presence of observers, in general? The difference is pivotal.
Given that we are observers, the conditions necessary for our presence as observers are no
different from the conditions necessary for our presence simpliciter, and we might reformulate
the WAP accordingly:
WAP1: “What we can expect to observe must be restricted by the conditions
necessary for our presence.”
This is an uncontroversial claim, since “we” can only observe the properties of worlds that
allow our presence. So for example, we cannot observe a world or a universe in which we failed
to evolve, even if that universe has earth-like planets and other DNA-based life forms.3
Clearly, most proponents of anthropic reasoning understand Carter’s principle in a different
way, interpreting WAP as,
WAP2: “What we can expect to observe must be restricted by the conditions
necessary for the presence of observers.”
Application of WAP2 requires one to establish what “observers” are, and then to identify the
conditions necessary for their presence. The constraint is much looser than the constraint
imposed by WAP1, in that it admits universes which do not contain “us”, do not contain
human beings at all. Furthermore, although WAP2 tells us that what we can expect to observe
is restricted by the conditions necessary for observers, it does not tell us anything about the
likelihood of our observing particular conditions, even though it does instruct us to calculate
the probability distribution of the parameters over the sub-ensemble of universes that support
the existence of observers. In order to extract concrete predictions from WAP2, it must be
2See [13] and [14] for further discussion of the problem of the reference class.
3Interpreting the weak anthropic principle in this way more or less implies the “top-down” approach of [15].
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supplemented by the principle of mediocrity (or something similar), which stipulates that we
are typical observers. But of course we need not be, or we may be typical of one class of
observers and atypical of another (as in the Googolverse example above).
Thus any application of WAP2 requires us to choose a particular reference class with respect
to which we choose to assume typicality. As noted in the previous section, proponents of
anthropic reasoning normally suggest that we condition on the broadest possible reference
class of observers. However, this is at odds with ordinary practices of statistical inference.
When one is attempting to account for selection effects (which is after all the entire point
of anthropic reasoning), one does so by conditioning on as detailed a description as possible.
So, for example, if we know that the cosmological constant Λ = 0.75 ± .0.05, then we should
demand typicality with respect to this, for this is what we should expect to see, given what we
know about ourselves. If we know that Λ = 0.75 exactly, then we should condition on this. If
one conditions on precise values for all cosmological parameters, then there is no need at all
for a principle of mediocrity — no need to assume that we are typical members of some larger
ensemble. Taking selection effects as seriously as possible is thus equivalent to appealing to
WAP1 as a principle of inference.
Taking selection effects seriously does not mean that we are in any way ignoring the usual
role of typicality in statistical reasoning. Appeals to the notion of statistical significance
presuppose, not that the observer is randomly chosen (i.e., “typical”), but that the observations
made by a given observer are random. To the extent that this observer does not have access to
the entire ensemble under scrutiny, selection effects, anthropic or otherwise, must be taken into
account. Thus we filter out the effects of the galaxy and other known effects (e.g., the dipole
anisotropy) from our CMB observations, and only then require that what remains lie within,
say, the 95% confidence interval of the statistics generated by the theory we are interested in
confirming.
4 Conclusion
WAP1 and WAP2 are both interpretations of the weak anthropic principle, and both are
incontrovertibly true. Why, then, have we suggested that one should use WAP1 rather than
WAP2? Because WAP1 directly yields testable predictions, while WAP2 requires one to both
identify a particular class of observers and apply the principle of mediocrity with respect to
the class chosen. To be sure, WAP1 makes the simultaneously trivial and strong claim that
if the theory assigns a non-vanishing probability to the parameter values we do observe, then
that is what we should expect to observe. If on the other hand the theory assigns a probability
of zero to the values that we observe, then of course the theory is ruled out.
With respect to theory confirmation, one should certainly not say that the fact that the
universe we observe is predicted with some probability (however small or large) serves as
a confirmation of the theory. But then, why would anyone expect that one could reason
inductively from a single data point in the first place?
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